Mojtaba Tabriziniya Tabrizi; Abdolrasoul Kheirandish; Ataollah Hassani; Reza Shabani
Abstract
The cannon, as a heavy, collective, expensive weapon, requiring training in the use and expense of construction, maintenance, and deployment could only be in the hands of the central government. Historical evidence suggests that the use of this modern weapon has been a decisive and accelerating factor ...
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The cannon, as a heavy, collective, expensive weapon, requiring training in the use and expense of construction, maintenance, and deployment could only be in the hands of the central government. Historical evidence suggests that the use of this modern weapon has been a decisive and accelerating factor in controlling centrifugal forces, suppressing local rogue rulers, and consolidating and expanding central sovereignty. As a result of the expansion of central government authority over all the Safavid territory gained through the shelling of the cannon, the reign of Shah Abbas I was accompanied by the least internal strife, and this resulted in great victories in the frontier battles (the conquest of Yerevan by Shah Safi and the conquest of Kandahar and the defense of it three times against the Mongolian government of India), which also relied on artillery fire. With the emergence of signs of weakness of the Safavid rule and the start of widespread border revolts, although the gunners have always been part of the army, their incapability in effectively use artillery in the fortress war (face to face war) led to the overthrown of the government army and eventually, the collapse of the Safavids.
In the repression of local rulers if the "fortress war" took place, the destructive power of the bullets and the sound of cannon shattering would defeat any resistance, but in the " fortress war and face-to-face" wars, in the Safavid period, sufficient skill was used. The artillery was not effective and decisive. The research method is descriptive-analytical and based on library studies.
Ali Naderianfar; Seyyed Alireza Abtahi; Soheila Torabi Farsani
Abstract
After the rise of Reza Shah to power and adoption of a policy of centralization, many attempts were made to establish the authority of the central government throughout Iran, including Baluchestan. These attempts, however, were challenged by local governments. One of the challenges was posed by Doust ...
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After the rise of Reza Shah to power and adoption of a policy of centralization, many attempts were made to establish the authority of the central government throughout Iran, including Baluchestan. These attempts, however, were challenged by local governments. One of the challenges was posed by Doust Mohammad Khan Barakzai and Juma Khan Ismailzahi's rebellion in the years 1928 and 1940 AD. The questions this study aims to tackle include: what was the main reason behind the insurgency of this Baluch commander and how was it suppressed? The subject will be investigated through a historical analysis and using a descriptive-analytical method based on archived and classified documents from 1928 to 1940 AH. The findings of the research indicated that, unlike other movements of the time, such as the rebellion of Sheikh Khazal in Khuzestan, Gilan, and Azerbaijan, the rebellion of Doust Mohammad Khan Barakzai and Juma Khan Ismailzai there was no color and smell of separation and independence movement and their efforts were due to the domination of foreigners, especially the UK, the mistreatment of military personnel with the people of the Region and the expansion of their political and economic authority. A careful look at the implications of the documents under review showed that the main reason for the failure of Khan Baluch movement was the lack of understanding of the late Qajar and early Pahlavi statesmen, especially Reza Shah.
